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Abstract. The need to generate authentic public 
involvement is one of the most pressing issues in 
environmental management. For years, the command 
and control approach relied on indirect participation 
methods such as public hearings and comment periods. 
Continually, these methods proved ineffective and 
fostered the frustration and distrust they were trying to 
dispel. Realizing that environmental issues were more 
complex, recent attempts for more collaborative and 
flexible approaches to decision making at all levels of 
government have increased experimentation with direct 
forms of involvement. Based on assumptions of 
equality, the common good and consensus decision-
making, one such effort is the consensus-based 
stakeholder approach. In this project, I demonstrate that 
in practice consensus-based efforts demonstrate 
problems of exclusion and inequality identified by 
critics of this ideal form of public argument leading to 
frustration and distrust. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although often fragmented and diffuse, efforts 
which attempt to unite stakeholders in consensus 
decision making share assumptions of representation, 
equality, unification for the common good and 
consensus-based decision making derived from an ideal 
notion of public argument. The conflict, disagreement 
and frustration that results as these processes are 
increasingly implemented are often attributed to 
specifics of the particular case such as the inability of 
lead agencies to correctly implement the process. 
However, according to critics, this form of public 
argument will inevitably produce such results. In this 
project, I draw on the research of these critics in order 
to identify problematic assumptions in the consensus-
based stakeholder approach and to explore the 
constraints these assumptions place on participants 
through a case study of the Georgia Ports Authority's 
Stakeholder Evaluation Group. From this analysis, I 
aim to offer suggestions for researchers and 
practitioners toward a workable forum for public 
participation. 
PUBLIC ARGUMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PARTICIPATION 
The consensus-based stakeholder approach is based 
on ideal assumptions of public argument. In this 
section, I briefly outline the theoretical foundation of 
these assumptions and link them to the stakeholder 
model. 
Ever since Habermas outlined his ideal version of 
public political participation in The Structural  
Transformation of the Public Sphere, researchers in 
political science, philosophy and rhetoric have grappled 
with the workability of his model in American politics. 
According to Habermas, authentic citizens input into 
governance can occur when citizens "come together as a 
public; . . . to engage [public authorities] in a debate 
over the general rules governing relations in the 
basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labor" (Habermas, 
1989, p. 27). Inequalities in status are bracketed as 
individuals join together in the pursuit of the common 
good. Consensus decisions are made according to the 
rational quality of argument rather than the social power 
of the arguer, resulting in naturally rational decisions. 
Despite the seeming appropriateness of this model 
for democratic political participation, it has been widely 
criticized on a number of grounds. First, many scholars 
critique the view that social inequalities can and should 
be bracketed in democratic political debate. Craig 
Calhoun argues that Habermas's notion of equality 
"impoverishes his own theory" by ignoring "the power 
relations, the networks of communication, the 
topography of issues and the structure of influence in 
the public sphere" (1992, p. 35). According to Nancy 
Frazer (1992), when subordinate groups become 
included in debate as equals, elite control of vocabulary 
and meaning excludes them from discussion. In this 
sense, the ideal of an equal and inclusive public sphere 
actually "masks subtle forms of control" (1992, p. 119) 
and "works to the advantage of dominant groups in 
society and to the disadvantage of subordinates" (1992, 
p. 120). 
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Second, scholars criticize the notion that diverse 
individuals can unite in the spirit of the public good. 
Geoff Eley (1992) argues that public debate is "partial 
and narrowly based . . . a field of conflict, contested 
meanings and exclusion" (1992, p. 308) making 
unification impossible. Thomas McCarthy (1989) 
contends that due to the "socially, culturally, and 
psychologically diverse" (p. 128) nature of 
contemporary society, promoting a vision of the 
common good will lead to the exclusion of certain 
topics and groups. Koivisto and Valiverronen (1996) 
claim that Habermas's emphasis of a unified good 
identifies only justice and economy as suitable topics 
for political discussion to the exclusion of other issues. 
Third, many scholars criticize the practicality and 
workability of consensus based decision-making. 
McCarthy (1992) suggests that in a pluralistic society 
where there is "no common measure by which to assess 
the relative weights of reasons articulated in different 
evaluative languages" (p. 65) the notion that people will 
naturally agree that one argument is more rational is 
impractical. Mouffe (1999) suggests that the belief 
"that political questions can be decided rationally" (p. 
753) can lead to the domination by those with the most 
social power. 
Despite these criticisms, Habermas's ideals have 
reemerged in recent years in the discourse of 
philosophers and political scientists who are frustrated 
with the special interest based politics dominating the 
political scene. These researchers promote a 
deliberative view of democracy directed by Habermas's 
ideal of citizen involvement. Their theoretical 
discussions have filtered into the area of environmental 
public participation where researchers are increasingly 
promoting models based on this notion of public 
argument. 
Increasingly in recent years researchers have 
promoted more interactive efforts as a solution to the 
frustration resulting from traditional participation 
efforts. For example, Juanillo & Scherer (1995) 
suggested weighing and debating conflicting values 
through a dialectical model of communication. In this 
model, information reflecting multiple perspectives 
flows freely between equal stakeholders. All have the 
opportunity to share information, become informed and 
to weigh options. In the end, holistic judgments are 
reached through consensus. 
Killingsworth and Palmer (1992) likewise suggested 
a model of public participation based on the "central 
experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus 
bringing force of argumentative speech, in which 
different participants overcome their merely subjective 
views and, owning to the mutuality of rationally  
motivated conviction, assure themselves of . . . the unity 
of the objective world" (p. 166). 
With President Clinton's commitment to reinventing 
our environmental protection system in 1995, such 
suggestions emerged in practice. Beginning with the 
premise that "better decisions result from a 
collaborative process with people working together" 
this administration worked closely with the EPA and 
other agencies such as the DOE in the attempt to 
implement participation processes that directly included 
citizens in environmental decision making. Many of 
these efforts such as EPA's Project XL, Community 
Advisory Panels and Good Neighbor Dialogues were 
consensus stakeholder model types based on 
Habermasian assumptions about public argument 
(Spyke, 1998). Similar efforts have begun to appear on 
the state and local levels as well. 
ASSUMPTIONS OF A STAKEHOLDER MODEL 
Although each participation effort is unique (Spyke, 
1998), those relying on a consensus-based stakeholder 
model demonstrate similar assumptions. Discussions of 
these practices by researchers and practitioners reveal 
the assumptions that stakeholders can be representative 
and equal, that all can unite in the spirit of the public 
good and that true consensus decisions can result. 
Because they contain such assumptions, these efforts 
also experience the practical problems outlined by 
critics. 
First, stakeholders are defined as representative of the 
public interest. Stakeholders are "capable, concerned 
people representing a broad spectrum of interests" 
(Hendee, et al ,1976, p. 134). They come from "all 
segments of the community" (Mazmanian & Nienaber, 
1976, p. 238). They "should be representative of the 
community in age, gender, socioeconomics, ethnicity, 
and stakeholder interest" (Murdock & Sexton, 1999, p. 
385), including "disadvantaged groups and community 
activists" (Murdock & Sexton, 1999, p. 384; Spyke, 
1999). Although these discussions suggest a desire to 
include all interested parties, logistical constraints lead 
practitioners to limit those involved to "the 'right' 
interests (Fox, 1998, p. 9). The right interests are often 
defined as those with "a major stake in the issue" 
(Edgar, 1990, p. 230) such as those downwind and 
downstream. In this sense, individuals not 
geographically or financially linked are excluded. 
Continually described as representative, the process 
hides subtle exclusion. 
Next, stakeholders are considered to be equal. In 
these efforts, stakeholders "become a partner in the 
decision making process" (Spyke, 1999, p. 17). They 
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discuss issues in a "neutral" (John & Mlay, 1999, p. 
367) forum where "all parties bring something to the 
table (Murdock & Sexton, 1999, p. 390). Such 
discussions of partnership and a free exchange of 
information imply that all participants are free and 
equal. However, in practice, stakeholders are often 
distinguished according to level and type of interest 
(Murdock & Sexton, 1999, p. 4). For example, the EPA 
ranks stakeholders according to the categories "of 1) 
those who want to be involved with the process; 2) 
affected parties; 3) anyone with an interest in the project 
or activity" (Murdock & Sexton, 1999, p. 4). In 
addition, the Federal Advisory Committee Act keeps 
agencies from participating as equal participants in 
stakeholder processes. Such distinctions inevitably 
allow some groups to have more power. 
Once stakeholders are identified, they are to enter 
into "community dialogue" (Farrell, 1999, p. 4). 
Through this discussion, participants "may find there is 
more common ground than expected" (John, & Mlay, 
1999, p. 368). In the words of President Clinton, 
deliberation enables participants to "bridge differences, 
find common ground, and identify new solutions." In 
practice however, different views of citizen 
participation often lead to disagreement rather than 
unification. According to Wengert, "Government 
agencies (i.e. the bureaucracy) will regard public 
participation . . . as a way of gaining legitimacy and 
public support . . . to members of the public, 
participation may be important for personal reasons or 
to seek to frustrate plans and proposals regarded as 
unsound and desirable" (Wengert, 1976, p. 34). In 
addition, different stakeholder may hold "different 
values of natural resources and environmental quality" 
(Crowfoot & Wondolleck, p. 6). Disagreement over 
issues such as these makes unification in the spirit of the 
common good unobtainable. 
At the heart of these processes is the notion that 
debate and unification will lead to consensus, often 
"defined as an outcome that, as a package, everyone can 
live with)"(Fox, 1998, p. 3). Since the result is a 
decision recommended by all it should yield the most 
effective, workable solution possible. However, 
according to practitioners, consensus decision making 
"undermines the administrative goals of efficiency, 
expertise and control, which drive agencies to seek 
quick public approval of predetermined solutions. On a 
more practical level, "public participation is inefficient 
in terms of cost and time, and can result in lowest-
common-denominator solutions if decision makers 
strive to accommodate as many views as possible" 
(Spyke, 1999, p. 6). Consensus decisions often reflect 
only one side of the spectrum of interests. 
CASE STUDY: STAKEHOLDER EVALUATION 
GROUP 
As demonstrated in the discussions of participation 
practitioners 	and 	researchers, 	consensus-based 
stakeholder models demonstrate characteristic 
assumptions and problems of a deliberative democratic 
view of public argument. In the following section, I 
briefly explore this conclusion in the context of the 
Georgia Ports Authority's Stakeholder Evaluation 
Group. This analysis represents the second and yet to be 
completed phase of an ongoing study. 
The Georgia Ports Authority [GPA] maintains two 
terminals in Savannah. Although basically a shallow 
river continued development and maintenance has made 
Savannah into a world class port. To perpetuate this 
trend in the midst of increased competition and changes 
in the shipping industry, the Ports Authority suggested 
deepening the harbor from 42 feet (1994 deepening) to 
50 feet in 1998. The Tier I EIS/FS produced by GPA 
drew much criticism from environmental groups and 
agencies who felt it was rushed and feared the impact of 
increased salinity on the Savannah National Wildlife 
Refuge, the struggling striped bass and shortnosed 
sturgeon populations and the city and industrial water 
supply. In response, GPA formed a Stakeholder 
Evaluation Group [SEG]. 
Formed in January of 1999 to identify environmental 
impacts of the project and formulate a plan to alleviate 
its effects, the SEG demonstrated the assumptions and 
resulting problems discussed above. First, openness 
was continually emphasized. However, the meeting day 
and time of Tuesday from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm clearly 
excluded some members. The group's continual focus 
on environmental impacts and good science also 
excluded other interests such as the aesthetics of 
increasingly larger ships entering the harbor. In turn, no 
private public attended after the first meeting. Although 
the group appeared representative, it was not. 
Next, equality in providing input and offering issues 
for consideration was continually stressed. However, 
GPA often tried to limit the issues to be considered. 
They also pressured federal agencies with authority over 
the project to become more involved and catered to their 
wishes. Constrained by the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act these groups continually absolved 
themselves of power. 
The group made decisions by consensus. In the 
beginning, there was confusion over what this meant. 
Often consensus would be reached on points only to be 
debated again. Consensus later turned into majority 
voting resulting in a decision that was partial rather 
complete in its reflection of entire group's interests. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case demonstrates the conclusion that in 
practice, consensus-based stakeholder models inevitably 
produce exclusion, inequality, conflict and partial 
decisions. Critics of deliberative democracy offer a 
number of helpful suggestions. McCarthy (1989), 
Frazer (1992) and Mouffe (1999) call for the 
recognition of power inequalities and the airing of 
disagreement in a variety of forums as the best model of 
contemporary public argument. This conclusion 
indicates that inequality and diversity must be 
recognized in existing participation mechanisms. 
Recognition of these elements would build trust and 
allow participants to work within these constraints, 
resulting in a more productive process. Second, 
consensus processes should be supplemented with 
additional efforts undertaken to air disagreement. The 
lead agency could host numerous informal discussions 
with a variety of diverse citizen groups. 
The above suggestions are merely preliminary 
findings. Completion of the study will enable me to 
offer a more complete contribution toward the goal of 
making participation more productive. 
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